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Abstract
Analogy ajid metaphor have a long history ofstudy in linguistics, education, philoso
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phy andpsychology. Consensus over what analogy is or how analogy functions in language
and thought, however, has beenelusive. This paper, the first in a two part series, examines
these various research traditions, attempting to bring out major lines of agreement over
the role of analogy in individual human experience. As well as being a general literature
review which may be helpful for newcomers to the study of analogy, this paper attempts
to extract from these literatures existing theories, models and concepts which may be
interesting or useful for computational studies of analogical reasoning.
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1. Introduction
While metaphor and analogy have a long-appreciated history in the arts, the same
has not always been true in traditional academic approaches to the subject. As noted
by Johnson (1981), prior to the last two decades metaphor was consistently ignored in
"respectable" philosophical discussion. Since the 1960's, however, there has been an
explosive growth in research on metaphor and analogy, both in philosophy and other
disciplines, to the point that we are currently experiencing "metaphormania" (Johnson,
1981, p. ix). This paper is the first in a two part series which reviews portions of this
growing literature in linguistics, education, philosophy of science and psychology. This
literature is examined both to achieve a general understanding of the subject matter and
to determine what these traditional research disciplines might contribute to computational
studies of metaphor and analogy. By far, psychological studies of metaphor and analogy
appear to be the most promising contributors, and a review of that work forms the bulk
of this paper. The second paper in this series focuses on computational approaches to
analogical reasoning which, by comparison to other disciplines, are just beginning.
Most studies of metaphor or analogy begin by pointing out the prevalence of figurative
language and reasoning in cognitive experience. Analogical reasoning appears to occur
in even the most mundane forms of human cognition. The widespread occurrence of
figurative language consisting either of novel or "frozen" (so commonly accepted as to
appear literal) metaphors is evident in virtually any sample from the news media (Schon,
1979; Carbonell, 1981) and even in scientific writing (Reddy, 1979). Analogical reasoning
has long been considered a key constituent abilityof the human intellect (Sternberg, 1977)
and has figured heavily in considerations of a variety of cognitive activities from problem
solving (Polya, 1954; Dreistadt, 1969) to creative thought more generally (Boden, 1978).
The use of analogy in teaching has a long history, with the presentation of new concepts
by comparison with analogically related older concepts comprising the bulk of didactic
material in textbooks. Hence, widespread research interest in such a commonplace form
of cognition is understandable.
1.1. Terminology
To reduce confusion, this paper outlines terminological conventions before surveying
different academic approaches to metaphor and analogy. As with research into most areas
of language and thought, terminology in the study of analogical reasoning varies across
differing resezirch approaches. In addition, the meaning of terms in the context of research
differs from commonplace usage. This is certainly true of terms like analogy, metaphor,
and reasoning as appended to either of the first two terms. In fact, the meaning of these
terms constitutes a major research question in many of the studies surveyed in this paper.
Common academic usage outside the field of artificial intelligence (AI) takes metaphor
in the most general sense to refer to the juxtaposition of dissimilar domains of knowledge,
with analogy being a special case of metaphor in which particular elements of these
domains are explicitly placed in correspondence. Hence, metaphorical rezisoning refers
to the process of discovering (if necessary) and then articulating points of correspondence
between domains.
As conventionally used in the AI literature, however, these terms have taken on
somewhat different meanings, metaphor being associated with figurative language use and
analogy being used more broadly to describe a type of reasoning about literally dissimilar
domains of knowledge. For convenience and, hopefully, without violating custom unnec
essarily, the terms metaphor and analogy will be used interchangeably, each referring
to the general notion of juxtaposing domains of knowledge which, given a successfully
elaborated basis of correspondence, can be viewed as being similar in some respects. More
specific definitions or terminology will be introduced as necessary in describing individual
studies.
With respect to the domains of knowledge involved in analogical reasoning, some
additional terminology will be required. Typically one domain, referred to as the source
or vehicle in this paper, is well understood relative to the other domain, termed the
target, tenor, or topic. The correspondence established during analogical reasoning will
be termed the ground and provides a mapping through which knowledge of the source can
be imported into the target domain. The specific nature of such a mapping provides the
focus of most studies surveyed here. For example, a skilled spades player might approach
the card game of hearts by recognizing that many of the strategies applicable in spades
(e.g., preferring hands with many cards of the spade suit and attempting to take as many
tricks as possible) can be applied in an inverse fashion in the game of hearts. Knowledge of
playing spades serves as the source, hearts the target, and inverted strategies the ground
in this example of analogical reasoning.
2. Metaphor and linguistics
Unfortunately, figurative language has generally received uneven attention in lin
guistics. Typically, metaphor is explained away as unnecessary ornamentation or as an
aberration in an otherwise well-behaved linguistic repertoire. Chomsky (1965), for ex
ample, characterizes metaphor as the violation of semantic selection rules arising from
the literal incongruity of tenor and vehicle. In this account metaphors are comprehended
through substitution of well-formed, literal sentences which conform to selection rules.
Hence, figurative language is a mere substitution of non-literal for literal expression and
becomes a matter of performance rather than linguistic competence.
Much recent work on metaphor, particularly from a psychological orientation (Honeck,
1980), is in direct opposition to this narrow substitution view. Alternative conceptions of
metaphor cornprehension focus more closely on discovery of the ground relating tenor and
vehicle, and allow a larger role for metaphor in both language use and cognition generally.
Much of what is salient in this wider consideration of analogical reasoning can be traced to
Black's (1962,1979) differentiation betweencomparison and interaction views of metaphor.
Comparison views stress implicit but still literal contrast between descriptive features of
topic and vehicle, while interaction views focus on a more broad juxtaposition of systems
of knowledge associated with tenor and vehicle. In the latter case, the ground supporting
metaphorical juxtaposition of tenor and vehicle may involve figurative as well as literal
relations. For example, men are like wolves by virtue of predation, but this relation must
be interpreted figuratively since (most) men do not hunt in packs, etc. As a result of
elaborating the ground in this fashion, entirely new meanings may arise for both tenor and
vehicle domains.
Estimated to occur at a rate of 4 per minute in natural language discourse (Pollio,
et al. 1977) and with a frequency of 5per 1000 words in educational texts (Ortony, 1976),
metaphors form a rather bulky portion of our linguistic output to simply explain away
and have prompted many to claim that any comprehensive theory of linguistic competence
must include a careful treatment of figurative language use. The frequency with which
figurative language occurs also suggests that metaphor may play both a powerful and
necessary role in bringing language into contact with perceptual experience.
From a pragmatic perspective, metaphor entreats the listener to view or understand
some topic in a particular way and hence plays a powerful role by establishing a context
suggestive of the speaker's intent. Beyond facilitating individual discourse, metaphor
provides a fundamental, culturally-shared perceptual framework for experience. That
is, there are inter-individual metaphors that we "live by" (Lakeoff and Johnson, 1980) in
the sense, for example, that positivevaluation might be expressedspatially as in "We were
up for the occasion." The power ofmetaphor is mademore concrete in a provocative paper
by Schon (1979) in which generally accepted cultural metaphors are shown to provide a
means of "seeing-as," suggesting which aspects of a situation are salient and what sorts of
solutions might apply. For. example, inner-city slums are frequently described as "urban
blight," thus likening unpopular social communities to an agricultural disease amenable
to diagnosis and treatment, in this case by social technology aimed at eradicating an
aberrant growth. In this way, a metaphor constrains consideration of its tenor, suggesting
some particular interpretation while obscuring others. From an alternative perspective,
inner-cityslums mightbe viewed as natural communities, to be supported by encouraging
positive community growth. With some thought this problem-setting function ofmetaphor
can be detected allaround us: mental illness, cognition ascomputation, people cis property,
andsurging psychological forces, to name a few. It is difficult to deny that these metaphors
have played, and continue to play, a powerful role in human affairs.
In terms of necessity, metaphor has been described as extending the semantic de
notation of a fairly rigid vocabulary to cover our more fluid range of experience (Ortony,
1975; Black, 1979). Briefly, metaphor is seen to provide a mechanism by which common
word senses are extended to include novel experiences rather than creating new words out
of descriptive necessity. A simple example might be the figurative expression, "leg of a
triangle," which has become so commonplace as to be considered a literal statement. Such
dead or frozen metaphors are suggestive artifacts of the dynamic, polysemantic nature of
our language use. Hence new experiential entities must be seen as more familiar entities if
our symbolic representation of the world is to remain tractable.
3. Metaphor in education
Despite the prevalence of metaphor in educational writing, a heated debate has
developed within the field of educational psychology as to the desirability of instruction
by analogy. Ortony (1975) argues that metaphor provides three features both necessary
and desirable in education (and, more generally, in language use):
1. metaphors serve as a compact set of instructions for reconstructing experience;
2. metaphors allow us to express experiences which our current language cannot literally
describe;
3. and metaphors provide a vivid communicational medium closer to our perceptual,
cognitive and emotive experience.
Hence metaphors allow us to speak of things which we have experienced but cannot literally
express and to do so in a compact and vivid fashion. Assuming a recipient's knowledge
of the vehicle and an adequately specified ground, Ortony claims that metaphors enhance
understandability and memorability of learned material.
This facilitative view of educational metaphor has been challenged. Miller (1976)
taJses exception to Ortony's enthusiasm by arguing that metaphors in educational writ
ing "gloss over" ah insufiicient command of difficult concepts on the part of the teacher
or writer and provide an oftentimes emotionally manipulative basis for specious argu
ments. Specifically, the compactness of metaphorical expression leads to ambiguity of
interpretation on the part of a heterogeneous audience, and figurative expression of the
"inexpressible" leads to vagueness and loss of clarity. Ortony (1976) counters with an
inventive metaphor involving misused tools, arguing that the use of screwdrivers in violent
criminal acts should not preclude the use of screwdrivers in carpentry.
In an effort to subject these arguments to empirical verification, Reynolds and
Schwartz (1983) have tested subject's recall for short text passages concluded with either
a metaphorical summary (e.g., "the sheep followed the leader over the cliff" concluding
an historical account of Nazi Germany) or its literal equivalent. Results indicate that
metaphorical summarization enhances cued recall of text passages (allowing for paraphras
ing during recall), although passage novelty also has an appreciable effect on memorability.
The authors cautiously conclude with alternative explanations: increased recall may be
attributable to additional processing during comprehension or to the formation of a specific
memory on the basis of a metaphorical summary which later guides reconstruction of the
original text. In either case, the argument that metaphorical explication may facilitate
comprehension and memorability of new material appears to have some support, although
specific suggestions for the use of metaphor or analogy in teaching are not drawn.
Beyond the pragmatic utility of metaphor in education, many have argued strongly
for its necessity in learning anything which is truly novel. Elements of this view in Ortony's
(1975) description of metaphor as fiexibly extending discrete symbol systems to continuous
life experience are expanded by Haynes (1975). She argues for an interactive level (i.e.,
insight or discovery) of metaphor comprehensionwhich involves hypothesis generation and
experimentation by the recipient of the metaphor. Hence metaphor is seen to provide a
"creative leap" in which new insights modify existing conceptual structures of both topic
and vehicle. Petrie (1979) supports this view, arguing for the necessity of metaphor in
"leaping the epistemological chasm between old knowledge and radically new knowledge"
(p. 440). Metaphor, through its literal incongruity, presents an anomaly to be resolved by
a learner engaged in active hypothesis generation and verification.
Quite a similar debate overthe utility ofmetaphor in educational settings has surfaced
in regard to learning to use computing systems. Halasz and Moran (1982) argue that
open-ended metaphors tend to confuse computing novices, particularly to the extent that
multiple, incompletely specified analogies are presented to acconomodate various system
features. What results, according to their analysis, is a "baroque collection of special-
purpose models pasted together in a more-or-less integrated and more-or-less consistent
fashion" (p. 34). Instead they argue for the presentation of carefully tailored conceptual
models which reflect software system design. From this viewpoint, metaphor is used at
most as a stylistic device for presentation of particular aspects of the model, but is to
be discarded once a concept has been learned. Unfortunately, in addition to ignoring the
active, experimentation inducing properties of educational metaphors, these authors give
meager advice on how to construct teachable conceptual models for existing or proposed
software architectures.
In contrast, Carrol and Mack (1982) describe a role for metaphor quite similar to the
interactive leyel mentioned earlier. Noticing that computing novices oftentimes usesponta
neously generated analogies, these authors advocate designing system interfaces which take
advantage of these analogies and, hence, facilitate training. Instead of presenting static
conceptual models directly to the novice, they advocate the presentation of open-ended
metaphors to encourage a process of active learning in which the learner incrementally
extends the metaphorical ground through experimentation with the computing system.
As with Halasz and Moran, the ultimate goal of learning is a valid conceptual model of
some computing system. However, Carrol and Mack argue strongly for the importance of
metaphor as a component in active learning.
In summary, there are two broad classes of opinion concerning the role of metaphor
in education, and these views parallel the controversy described for linguistics. One view
takes metaphor to be literally comparative in the sense that essential descriptive qualities
could be provided by literal language as well. Although proponents of this view allow
metaphor some utility for making a point vividly, the attendant dangers of being vague
or misleading recommend careful literal expression rather than metaphor in teaching.
As described metaphorically by Fetrie, this view claims that "metaphors have all the
advantage over explicit language as does theft over honest toil" (p. 438). In contrast,
others describe metaphor as being not only desirable but essential. From this perspective,
metaphor provides a context for active experimentation on the part of the learner and a
means for accommodating truly novel experiences into existing conceptual structures.
4. Metaphor in the philosophy of science
A similar dichotomy of opinion occurs in the philosophy of science with respect to
the utility of metaphor in scientific theory construction. A strong empiricist bias against
figurative language as an imprecise medium for communication is counterbalanced by an
appreciation for the central role that open-ended metaphors play in scientific theorizing
(Hofiman, 1980). Beyond their explanatory utility, metaphors serve as components of
a theory which are not yet literally expressible, and through such a theory constitutive
role, they provide a new way of viewing the topic under investigation by focusing research
activity around elaboration of the metaphorical ground.
Boyd (1979) gives a revealing discussion ofthe role ofcomputing metaphors in cogni
tive psychology where functional relations among computational states in machines serve
as a vehicle for thinking about hypothesized psychological states and the interrelationships
among them. According to Boyd, such a metaphor provides "at a relatively early stage
theoretical terms to refer to various plausibly postulated computerlike aspects of human
cognition, which then become the objects of further investigation" (p. 370). Notions
of processing, feedback or retrieval as understood in computing can be used to generate
falsifiable hypotheses about cognitive constructs and, hence, provide an active research
program in addition to new descriptive terminology. Interestingly, Boyd notes that this
active elaboration of the metaphor can also influence knowledge of the vehicle domain, as
when empirical evidence for cognitive activity suggests novel program structure.
This view of scientiflc metaphor as providing a program for research is corroborated
by retrospective accounts ofnotable scientiflc activities. For example, Oppenheimer (1956)
while recounting the use of analogy in physics (e.g., light "waves") states "in every case
an immense amount of experience, of measurement, of observation, and of analysis has
gone both to the correction of the analogies and to their confirmation" (p. 133). Such
examples are numerous (Dreistadt, 1968) and underscore both the utility of metaphor in
scientific explanation and its suggestive power in a theory constitutive role. Hence, not
only does metaphor occupy a central position in the explanation of scientiflc theory, but
also appears to underlie novel insights into the nature of scientiflc problems. As a colorful
example, Dreistadt (1968) describes Kekule's sudden appreciation for the ring structure
of the benzene molecule on waking from a dream in which a snake has seized its own tail
and spun before his eyes. Thus metaphor can be described as having at least three roles in
scientiflc affairs: at the individual level of scientiflc insight, as an explanatory mechanism,
and in a larger context of providing a problem setting which gives impetus and direction
to continuing experimentation.
5. Metaphor in psychology
As measured against other cognitive phenomena, the use of metaphor has received
relatively little attention in psychology. Nonetheless, the psychological literature in this
area is broad and of considerable relevance for computational approaches to metaphor and
analogy. Hence, this section forms the bulk of this paper. Fortunately, theoretical and
empirical studies of analogical reasoninghave been periodically reviewed, thus allowing an
examination of this literature by major theoretical perspectives, including where possible
notable empirical findings. The discussionof psychologicalapproaches to analogical reason
ing will be roughly historical, with older, somewhat solidified research traditions presented
first, followed by a heterogeneous assortment of more current efforts. Of particular interest
will be hypothesized structures and processes which might be suggestive for research in
AI.
5.1. Theoretical approaches to metaphor and analogy in psychology
Perhaps one of the earliest approaches to analogical reasoning comes from the sys
tematic study of individual differences through the useofmental testing. Sternberg (1977)
characterizes differential theories by their assumption that analogical reasoning, as mea
sured by traditional psychometric tasks, draws on mental abilities which taken together
constitute intelligence. An example of such a task would be the solution of proportional
analogy items (e.g., A:B::C:[Dl,D2,...,Dk]) where the subject makes a choice among D
terms. The existence of these abilities can be demonstrated by the covariance of psychome
tric measures of analogical reasoning with hypothesized, underlying factors of intellectual
ability. Empirically, tests of analogical reasoning have been proposed as measures of:
1. measures of generalized intellectual ability,
2. fluid ability to reason among complex relations in problems not amenable to recalled
solutions (the latter viewed as crystallized ability),
3. and convergent production of a unifying concept by the grouping of divergent ideas.
Unfortunately, these hypothesized psychological constructs give no clear suggestions for
processes or representations supporting mental abilities and may not be generalizable
beyond the psychometric materials used in their demonstration.
Another early approach to the study of metaphor comes from Gestalt psychology
(Billow, 1977; Honeck, 1980) in which figurative constructions are seen to arise through
similarity of the "expressive qualities" of literally dissimilar events. Similarity at a sensory
level is supported by a number of assumptions concerning perceptual organization:
1. perception involves all sensory modalities simultaneously and thus allows synaesthetic
experiences (e.g., a "sad" landscape or "orange" warmth);
2. perceptual inputs come as undifferentiated and unanalyzable wholes;
3. and perceptual experience is inextricably embedded in a motoric and affective con
text.
Hence subjects are assumed to have an affective disposition towards a subject of experience
which naturally gives rise to metaphorical comparisons. For example, empirical evidence
has been shown for agreement across subjects in linear expression (i.e., relatively simple
line drawings) of linguistic connectives (e.g., and, if, because) in isolated sentences (Werner
and Kaplan, 1963). Unfortunately, the undifferentiated nature of such organismic theories
leaves specific processing or representational constructs unclear.
Psychodynamic theories have also contributed to the study of metaphor (Billow,
1977). Assuming the existence of an unconscious mind in which past events originally
experienced as being unpleasant or threatening remain active, similar events in cur
rent conscious experience axe seen to stimulate these repressed, threatening memories.
Metaphorical expressions arise in the speaker's unconscious attempt to discharge affec
tive energy stemming from these threatening unconscious experiences. As an example,
during therapy a patient's remark that "I've wandered off the point and can't find it
again" is seen to reflect a similarity between the patient's apprehension regarding negative
evaluation by the therapist and early childhood experiences in which the patient feared
maternal rejection on the basis of difficulties during breast feeding. Metaphors are of
interest to psychodynamic theorists, then, primarily in that they provide projective (in the
sense of unconscious material projecting into conscious manifestations) evidence of psychic
processes. Although the hypothesis of unconscious, surging affective forces meets with
resistance from other psychological orientations, metaphor as a mechanism of cognitive
homeostasis is interesting, particularly with respect to the evocative affective qualities
which many literary metaphors enjoy. However, it is not clear that the psycho dynamic
perspective contributes directly to an examination of the role of metaphor and analogy in
problem solving or learning as typically construed within a computational framework.
Although the bulk of psychological research assumes mediating cognitive processes,
metaphor has also been examined by behavioral psychologists (Billow, 1977; Paivio, 1979;
Honeck, 1980) with an eye towards excising unobservable mental events in favor of clearly
observable behavioral outcomes. Theoretically, metaphor is seen to arise out of stimulus
similarity such that verbal responses originally reinforced in the presence of a complex
of stimuli are emitted in the presence of new stimuli sharing sensory qualities with the
original complex. As an example, a child's first glass of soda water might elicit a response
likening the soda to the prickling sensations typically experienced when one's foot "falls
asleep." From this perspective, metaphor amounts to little more than a verbal utterance
which is relatively new in the commonplace verbal repertoire. Admitting limited influence
for cognitive mediation, some theorists have argued for an explanation of metaphor in
terms of common verbal associations, with utterances designated metaphorical arising out
of somewhat more remote associations than those occuring in normal discourse. Behavioral
theories of metaphor, by excluding mediating structure and process, are fundamentally at
odds with most research approaches in AI (at least information-processing approaches)
and appear to offer relatively little guidance to these activities.
As a final theoretical approach to analogical reasoning, information processing the
ories might seem promising for AI in their explicit concentration on representational
structures and processes which are amenable to computer simulation. Unfortunately, these
theories do not specifya particularly coherent set ofconstructs (Sternberg, 1977), diverging
widely over what constitutes likely structures and processes. Hypothesized cognitive struc
tures include fixed sets of relation types, prepositional networks, lists of transformation
operators, and lists of measurable features. Generalized processing notions include some
form of encoding or decomposition of stimulus inputs, inferential discovery of relationships
forming an analogical ground, application of these inferred relationships for the current
stimulus situation, and evaluation of inferred relationships with respect to possible goal
specifications (e.g., finding a unique or best solution candidate for a proportional anal
ogy item). Sternberg evaluates information processing theories harshly, concluding that
they generally fail with respect to adequate empirical support, complete specification of
processing mechanisms, generality across varied forms of analogies (most studies focus on
proportional analogy test items), and accounts of how individuals differ in their ability to
reason analogically. Nonetheless, information processing theories will be discussed at some
length in coming sections of this paper, including a component-process model advanced
by Sternberg.
5.2. Exemplary psychological studies
Descending from abstract theoretical orientations which are wide in scope, examina
tion of several recent psychological studies of analogy and metaphor can give some feeling
for both the depth and diversity of hypotheses currently flourishing. As a pragmatic
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Figure 1
Concepts as points in a multidimensional space (Rumelhart and Abrahamson, 1973).
division, these studies will be described separately by focus on proportional analogical
reasoning, metaphor comprehension, and problem solving by analogy. Several studies will
be described within eax:h area, followed by brief concluding remarks.
5.2.1. Studies ofproportional analogies
Study of proportional analogies in the psychological literature has continued, proba
bly owing to the use of proportional analogies as measures of intelligence in ecirly theories
of mental abilities and to the surface simplicity of these kinds of problems (i.e., target
and source are explicitly presented, along with partial information regarding the ground).
Furthermore, proportional analogies play a major role in many tests of general intellectual
ability, and so provide often-used indicators of cognitive development. With respect to
processing specificity, studies of proportional analogy are among some of the most complete
in the psychological literature, although this specificity may be purchased at the cost of
generality in underlying representational structure.
Analogy as conceptual proximity
Rumelhart and Abrahamson (1973) account for proportional analogical reasoning by
proposing a similMity metric of inverse geometric distance in a conceptual space modelled
£is a multidimensional coordinate system (see Figure 1). Concepts (animals in this case)
are represented as vector measurements over a fixed set of dimensions (ferocity, size and
humanness). Givensuch a representation for A, B, C and D terms, an ideal analogypoint,
I, is calculated as (C* + —Ajfc, for each of k dimensions). Solution of the proportional
analogy then amounts to selection of a D term which gives a minimal vector distance
from I. Empirical results with human subjects show that both first choice and rankings
of D terms fit those predicted under the hypothesized inverse distance similarity metric.
However, item variation is appreciable, suggesting differential item difficulty not predicted
by the theory. In addition, Rumelhart and Abrahamson show that arbitrary ideal analogy
points are trainable and can be used as nominal concepts in later analogical reasoning.
Figure 2
Sample item from Raven's Progressive Matrices (Hunt, 1973).
While these results are interesting, it is not clear that representation of concepts
£is points in a multidimensional sp2u:e would be sufficiently expressive for more complex
judgements of similarity (e.g., figurative similarity over abstract functional relations as in
Men are wolves). Specifically, dimensions participating in such a representation refiect a
rather clever condensation of information and processes contributing to similarity judge
ments which are largely implicit because of the spatial metaphor used in the description
of represented objects (Palmer, 1978). Prom a symbol-processing perspective, one might
wish that such information and processes were more explicitly refiected in the knowledge
representation. Interestingly, this notion of similarity expressible as distance in a multi
dimensional space has been advocated recently (Pzirker and Kiselewich, 1984) in the guise
of utilizing an "analog" representation to facilitate partial rule matching and generalization
in an expert system.
Feature-matching models of proportional analogy
Hunt (1973) gives "gestalt" and "feature malytic" process models of proportional
analogical reasoning for figural analogies from Raven's Progressive Matrices Test, an in
strument often used as a measure of general intellectual ability (see Figure 2). Matrix items
are encoded as unspecified visual figures or sets of features, respectively, for gestalt and
featural models. In both representations, figures within the matrix are distinguished from
background patterns, thus giving clear information regarding the salience of available stim
ulus materials. Gestalt processes find a solution by repeated application of continuation
(e.g., continue a line through a row element) or superimposition (e.g., align an element
by some arbitrary reference point) until a unique solution pattern is found which best
fits a candidate answer. The feature analytic process model essentially conducts means-
ends-analysis over a set of transformation operators (e.g., delete, expand or contract a
matrix element) to account for differences in features for given rows. Eventually a set of
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required features for the missing element can be found which is a subset of the features
describing a particular candidate solution. According to Hunt, hand simulation of gestalt
and featural process models favors the feature analytic model, which is capable of finding
correct solutions to all items on a standard form of the Progressive Matrices. An adult
achieving comparable results would be judged "bright."
As with Rumelhart and Abrahamson's work, it is not clear if Hunt's feature analytic
model could be extended to more complex forms of knowledge, although in fairness neither
study proposes to do so. The gestalt model presented by Hunt is unfortunately difficult to
evaluate owing to the indeterminate nature of "visual figures" and the operations which
compare and transform them. This latter difficulty holds much in common with gestalt
theoretical orientations towards analogical reasoning discussed earlier.
In a more recent contribution to the study of proportional analogical reasoning,
Sternberg (1977) presents a carefully crafted component-process model which incorpo
rates aspects of many more traditional approziches. Competence in solving proportional
analogies is hypothesized to rest on some additive combination of five mandatory process
components:
1. an encoding process identifies attributes and values for a term in the problem;
2. an inference process discovers a rule, X, relating A and B terms;
3. a mapping process discovers a rule, Y, relating A and C terms;
4. an application process applies the "higher order" rule, Y, to the inferred rule, X, to
generate a rule, Z, which relates C and D terms;
5. and a preparation-response process serves as a controlmechanism for monitoringother
processes and making a response.
Sternberg also mentions an optional justification process which may choose among alter
native candidate solutions if none unambiguously match a choice term.
On the basis of these primitive process components, Sternberg outlines several
alternative models which combine components in different ways. Latency and error mea
surements with human subjects are used to select one of these alternative models. The
preferred model is an additive combination of component processes in which subjects:
1. encode all terms of a particular analogy item,
2. exhaustively infer transformation rules for A and B terms,
3. incrementally map and apply attributes for A, C and D terms until a unique choice
option can be discriminated.
Thus, the empirically preferred model suggests that subjects thoroughly explore relations
between A and B terms, but perform mapping and application processes for each at
tribute within terms, stopping when a discriminating choice is possible between D terms.
Comparison of the proposed process model with human performance suggests that map
ping and application components are necessary (i.e., rules relating A to B terms are not
applied directly in the search for solution), and that encoding (i.e., mentally representing
terms of the item) takes more time than any other component while correlating positively
with overall performance. Grudin (1980) presents some disconfirming evidence for this
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model, showing that some subjects solving similar problems while thinking aloud appear
to discover the relation between A and C terms, and then apply this relation to the B term
in coming up with an answer.
As a mediating representation, stimulus terms are assumed to be stored in a working
memory as lists of attribute-value pairs. For example, consider the representation of the
concept, Lincoln, in the following analogy:
Washington:!::Lincoln:[a. 10, b. 5]
[president(16th), portrait-on-currency{5 dollars), war-hero(Civil)]
Sternberg claims this form of representation is isomorphic to Rumelhart and Abrahamson's
multidimensional space model (one might assume also to Hunt's feature analytic model).
However, Sternberg points out that such a simple featural representation is not a necessary
component of the model, and that other representational schemes might be accommodated
within the preferred component-process model.
Proportional analogical reasoning: some conclusions
In evaluating the contribution of studies of proportional analogical reasoning, it is
easy to be encouraged by the specificity of processing descriptions and apparent verification
with human experimentation. However, even the most careful work (probably that of
Sternberg) leaves much open to speculation. For example, the inferential "discovery" of
rules relating A to B terms apparently rests on some form of search through a space
of candidate relations, perhaps constrained by partial similarity between representations
of participating terms. Unfortunately, the inference process is hot clearly described, and,
given Sternberg's claim that alternative representations might be equally suitable, it seems
likely that the process of discovering relations between terms is beyond detailed description
as the theory stands. The discovery and use of mapping relations seems even more
problematic. Perhaps as has been pointed out in another context, "an entire homunculus
can be concealedwithin one processing bpx in a fiow diagram" (Gentner, 1983b). Were one
to ignore uneven process specification, there remains the issue of whether or not processes
implicated in proportional analogical reasoning are generalizable to less constrained forms
of reasoning.
Although discovery and application of analogical relationships seems likely in more
complex forms of analogy (e.g., aspects of theory formation and extension), clearer spec
ifications of knowledge representation and the integration of inferential processes are
necessary. For example, a subject's knowledge of Abraham Lincoln may include informa
tion regarding the presidency, five dollar bills and the civil war, but a moment's reflection
reveals seemingly innumerable other pieces of information (e.g., beardedness, humble be
ginnings, assassination, etc.) which might be considered in establishing some measure of
similarity between one's knowledge of Lincoln and an arbitrary target. While proportional
analogies introduce some measure of constraint in this search for salient similar aspects
of target and source, the specifics of "inference" and "mapping" processes advocated by
Sternberg would again seem to depend heavily on the representational medium in which
these processes occur.
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In a similar vein, the interpolative process proposed by Rumelhart and Abrahamson
depends upon ascaling of experimental items such that the three dimensions (size, ferocity
and humanness) do indeed capture relevant similarity among animals included in the study.
Were other, less salient dimensions included (e.g., warm or cold-bloodedness), it is not clear
that comparable results would be achieved. In both instances, a view of the underlying
representation is given which fortuitously provides just those semantic aspects seemingly
required to make sense of particular proportional analogies. Hence, although studies of
proportional analogical reasoning give a useful starting point for consideration of more
complex forms of reasoning (o.g., metaphor comprehension and problem solving), these
studies generally trade processing specificity against representational generality, if not
suffering on both counts.
5.2.2. Studies of metaphor comprehension
Studies ofmetaphor comprehension in the psychological literature are legion, concen
trating either on nominal metaphors or similes (i.e., Ais a B, Ais like B) out of context or,
less frequently, on metaphorical expressions in context (e.g., metaphorical summarization of
a text passage). Much of this research, particularly studies concerned with developmental
aspects ofmetaphor comprehension, has been confounded by poor controls for pre-existing
knowledge, difficulty and appropriateness of task materials, level ofexpressive competence
of subjects, and difficulty in distinguishing subjects' figurative expressions from simple
categorization mistakes (Ortony, Reynolds and Arter, 1978).
To illustrate central points in the diversity of opinion surrounding metaphor com
prehension, two widely divergent approaches will be described in some detail. The first
approach takes metaphor as an implied comparison oftarget and source concepts, depen
dent on common characteristics between them. The second approach casts metaphor as an
invitation to the reader (or hearer) to understand a target subject as some source subject,
restructuring the target in a novel way much in keeping with traditional interaction views
of metaphor. These approaches have obvious parallelism with views of metaphor and
analogy discussed in earlier sections.
Metaphor as feature comparison
Exemplary of comparison—based approaches to metaphor comprehension, Malgady
and Johnson (1980) describe a variety of studies in which mediating representations are
given as sets of attributive properties or features which are "open-ended" to reflect context
(linguistic and extralinguistic) and individual differences. In this approach, metaphor
depends upon the similarity between target and source concepts as defined by a weighted
linear function of the "salience" of common and distinctive features (Tversky, 1977).
Salience in this context refers to the relative frequency ofoccurrence ofa particular feature
determined over a normative sample inwhich subjects are asked to give descriptive features
of a concept. This allows a quantitative estimate of the typicality of various features and,
by composition, the salience of concepts they define. According to Malgady and Johnson,
"salience [of a concept] increases as the number ofdefining features increase, and as their
probabilities approach a rectangular distribution" (p. 249). Thus, for example, based on a
normative sample the concept of rain can be judged lower in salience than the concept of
tears. Assuming that order of comparison for target and source is reflected in the weights
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applied to distinctive features, similarity can be asymmetric depending on the salience of
compared concepts. For example, Poland would be judged more similar to the USSR than
the USSR to Poland, owing to higher salience provided by the feature set attributive of
the USSR.
Metaphor comprehension in this model occurs as distinctive features of the source are
transferred to the target where they are integrated in some unspecified fashion. "Good"
metaphors are assumed to have an intermediate level of contrast between target and
source concepts, being neither bizarre nor mundane. Empirical evidence is presented that
subjects' recall performance and judgements of similarity are higher for metaphors with
more salient source concepts, that subjects give greater attention to distinctive features of
the source than the target concept, and that modifiers included in metaphorical sentences
can enhance subjects' ratings of similarity and figurative goodness. These results are given
as support for the predictiveness of feature comparison models with respect to asymmetry
of similarity judgements and effects of linguistic context.
Metaphor as a transfer of abstract relations
In opposition to comparison-based approaches, Verbrugge and McCarrell (1977)
present a series of experiments designed to demonstrate the inadequacy of static sets of
features or properties as a basis for metaphor comprehension. They examine mediating
structures hypothetically resulting from metaphor comprehension, using prompted recall
of figurative sentences (e.g.. Billboards are warts on the landscape) as empirical evidence
for subjects' inference of a ground relating target and source concepts (e.g., are ugly
protrusions on a surface). These authors argue strongly for "abstract relations" as the basis
for such a metaphorical ground and against "attributive concepts" such as feature sets or
property lists. As a mediating representation, a "system of abstract transformational and
structural invariants" (p. 526) termed a schema is activated by recognition of nominal
terms (e.g., billboard) designating target and source domains. As an example of such
a schema for the source concept of "straw" in the metaphor, "Tree trunks are straws
for thirsty leaves and branches," Verbrugge and McCarrell suggest the following three
representational components:
1. structural invariants are "a structure of relatively rigid nonporous material, of a
hollow cylindrical shape, with a small diameter relative to its length;"
2. transformational invariants are "the vertical cylindrical space channels fiuid flow
from a receptacle to a destination against gravity; the goal of the fiuid transport is
to ameliorate thirst; the force for the flow is suction;"
3. and a normative contextual instantiation provides "the structure is paper or plastic,
the receptacle is a bottle or cup, the destination is a person (the thirsty agent), and
the source of suction is the person's mouth and lungs" (p. 526).
Verbrugge and McCarrell hypothesize that inference of the ground between target
and source domains should be reflected in accurate recall of figurative sentences when a
statement of abstract relations comprising the ground is provided as a recall cue. The
ground of a metaphor is seen to asymmetrically favor the source domain with abstract
relations extended to and instantiated in the target domain. In this way, the target domain
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may be "structured" in terms of relations holding in the source domain. Empirically, this
hypothesis is partially supported with high levels of recall when subjects are given the
relevant ground as a prompt (nearly as high as when given target and source terms as cues).
Other evidence is presented to rule out an explanation of recall performance in terms of
simple word associations or isolated effects of target and source concepts. However, while
the evidence does make some interaction between source and target concepts seeni likely,
subject performance does not appear incompatible with a comprehension model based on
a weighted combination of common and distinctive features as suggested by Malgady and
Johnson. In fact, Verbrugge and McCarrell's argument against comparison-based models
seems to rest heavily on the nature of the metaphorical grounds used as prompts in the
recall task. To accept their argument fully, one is forced into the position of treating these
prompts as if they were indeed systems of "structural and transformational invariants"
quite distinct from common and distinctive properties. This commitment is not a priori
compelling.
Verbrugge and McCarrell conclude by arguing that metaphor comprehension should
best be seen as the imposition of specific constraints from the source domain such that the
target domain is considered in a novel but restricted fashion. Furthermore, they argue that
these constraints, in the form of abstract relations refiecting structural and transforma
tional invariants with respect to a particular context, cannot be captured by conventional,
fixed attributive concepts in which features or properties are simply concatenated to form
meaning. To illustrate, the authors use two sentences with identical target terms:
1. Tree trunks are straws for thirsty leaves and branches.
2. Tree trunks are pillars for a roof of leaves and branches.
Structural invariants involved in the abstract relations forming the metaphorical ground
are context dependent (i.e., a hollow tube and a solid column, respectively) and provide
a novel way of considering the target concept. Verbrugge and McCarrell argue that such
context-dependent novelty, characteristic of all but relatively trite metaphors, would be
difficult to provide with a fixed set of attributive properties for tree trunks.
Although mediating structures and attendant processes are described in a translucent
fashion, the general character of metaphor comprehension in Verbrugge and McCarrell's
work is clear: target and source domains (not just terms) interact in a novel fashion
with oftentimes unpredictable results. Knowledge of the source domain serves as a filter or
framework for a restructuring of the target domain, and the resulting knowledge structures
represent a fusion of knowledge from both domains rather than a straightforward compar
ison. Although implicit, abstraction of domain knowledge appears to play an important
role in the discovery of relations capable of instantiation in both domains.
A recent report by Johnson (1984) makes the representation and process notions
suggested by Verbrugge and McCarrellsomewhat more explicit. Also studying the compre
hension ofisolated metaphors, Johnson proposes a set of "semantic combinators" (mapping
functions) which allow for differing levels of "accommodation" of mapped information be
tween target and source objects. As a representation, object schemata are described as
frame-like structures consisting of "facets." Facets, similar to Verbrugge and McCarrell's
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transformational invariants, are described as functional properties or relations of the rep
resented object which the possessor acquires during "goal-directed interaction with the
object" (p. 193). As an example, the hardness facet of rocks is given as "rocks do not
change shape under the application of external physical force" (p. 194). Other facets of
rocks described by Johnson include immobility, greyness in color and heaviness.
A three-stage process model is described, with a mapping function (or combinator)
given as an example at each stage (Johnson mentions but does not describe other mapping
functions). At an initial, global level of processing, an identity mapping may be formed
between facets of target and source. At this level, facets are transferred literally without
any change in semantics. For example, when confronted with a sentence such as, "My
shirt was a mirror," one might interpret the metaphor by directly transferring a reflective
facet of a mirror schema to a shirt schema. At a more analytic level ofprocessing (termed
analytical-1), an analogy mappingcan transfer a facet by a "change in sense" from source to
target schemata. For example, interpreting "My sister is a rock," one might accommodate
the sense of hardness contained in the source (rock) schema by replacing portions of the
hardness facet with informationmore consonant with the target (sister) schema. Hence the
hardness facet as transferred to the sister schema might read, "my sister does not change
behavior under the application of psychological pressure." At the third processing level
(termed analytical-2), a predicate mapping permits the elaboration of an analytical-1 level
mapping within the target domain. For example, having transferred the hardness facet as
described above for the analogy mapping, one might further infer that the speaker's relation
with his sister could be characterized as being unfriendly or interpersonally distant, both
following naturally from knowledgesources appropriate for the target schema but unrelated
to the source schema.
Johnson gives descriptive flndings as partial empirical support for this model of
metaphor comprehension. Asked for multiple interpretations ofsix, singlesentencemetaphors
(i.e., combinations of [My shirt. My sister] was a [rock, mirror, butterfly]), adult subjects
typicallygive two or three distinct interpretations. These interpretations weresubsequently
coded by Johnson to determine the types of facets and levels of mapping used by subjects
during interpretation. Johnson reports that 17% of all coded facet transfers were at the
global level (e.g., using an identity or related combinator), 27% were at the analytical-1
level, and 50% were at the analytical-2 level. The frequency of such responses varied
according to the type of objects given as target and source. For example, highest levels
of global transfer were identifled with "shirt" as the target, while "sister" as the target
apparently required some change in sense if the metaphor was to be meaningfully inter
preted. Although Johnson uses a coding framework drawn directly from her hypothetical
model, these descriptive flndings do suggest structures and processes which might underlie
metaphor comprehension in a manner consonant with an interaction view of flgurative
language use. Subjects' interpretations consist primarily of abstract relations which are
uncovered by more than direct comparison, particularly in the case of relations coded at
the analytical-2 level. In summary, Johnson gives an interesting account of the sort of
knowledge structures and mapping operators which might support the kind of flgurative
transfer implicated by Verbrugge and McCarrell.
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Metaphor comprehension: some conclusions
The approaches described above give fairlyconvincing but strongly divergent pictures
of psychological structures and processes supporting metaphor comprehension. "Attributive"
representations (e.g., feature sets), through their ease of operationalization, allow quan
titative measurement of the similarity of concepts which purportedly underlies metaphor
comprehension. Unfortunately, parsimony in describing the basis of judgements of sim
ilarity apparently contributes little to clear processing notions of comprehension. While
two concepts may be judged similar with some inter-subject reliability, it is not clear
how knowledge of a source domain is extended to a given target domain in the sense, for
example, of the theory constitutive metaphors discussed in an earlier section of this paper.
As Ortony et al. (1978) point out, comparison may be a component in metaphor compre
hension, but is probably insufScientas an exclusive explanation. In contrast, more complex
relational representations offer a richer explanatory vocabulary for metaphor comprehen
sion (e.g., the extension of invariant abstract relations from source to target), but falter
at the point of explicitly specifying or measuring characteristics of such representational
structures.
The distinction raised in preceding paragraphs between featural and structural me
diating representations extends beyond the particular studies presented here. Ortony et
al. (1978) discuss a similar distinction between prepositional and schema theories of se
mantics. Prepositional theories would include featural models such as that of Malgady
and Johnson (1980) as well as proposals which represent meaning directly as some fixed
set of propositions (e.g.. Miller, 1979). In these models, meaning is given by a relatively
static set of assertions assumed to capture "core meaning" or things which are necessarily
true of the concept being defined. As an example, a cow could be represented as a mature,
female member of cattle. Such representational commitments, through their inflexibility,
typically require special forms of processing for figurative language. These processes must
uncover literal statements of similarity implicitly underlying figurative expression. Ortony
et al. argue that such a representation of word meaning "simply fails to permit the kind
of flexibility that would be required to make sense of a metaphor" (p. 935).
Schema-based theories of semantics, on the other hand, are described as relatively
open-ended collections of stereotypic knowledge about concepts being represented. In
contrast with propositional accounts, a cow might be represented as a domesticated animal
which gives milk, eats grass, and is in turn eaten by humans. These and other elements
of practical knowledge are assumed to take the form of variables or slots with loose
constraints on suitable instantiating values, all interconnected by a system of relations.
Suchschemata, Ortony et al. argue, are more flexible than their propositional counterparts,
allowing figurative language to be understood in a similar fashion to literal language.
Candidate schemata are applied on the basis of a more or lesscomplete match with an input
expression, and judgements of metaphoricity occur post hoc on the basis of a constructed
understanding.
In a subsequent paper, Ortony (1979) argues that highly salient predicates involved
in source schemata can be "promoted" or actually "introduced" into the target domain,
resulting in a novel conceptualization of that domain. This process of matching and schema
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application, relatively straightforward for literal utterances, gives rise to the unpredictable,
interactive nature of language understanding implicated in the instantiation of "transfor
mational invariants" of Verbrugge and McCarrell. Rumelhart (1979) makes this argument
as well, claiming that comprehension of conveyed meaning in metaphorical utterances does
not depend on compositional notions of semantics, but rather that figurative and literal
language are comprehended in essentially the same fashion through the selection, appli
cation and verification of "conceptual schemata." Rumelhart and Norman (1981) extend
the same approach to the acquisition of procedural skills such as using a text editor.
From a distance, then, parallel themes can be discerned in the psychology of metaphor
comprehension, centering around representational proposals for semantics. Prepositional
representations generally lead to comparison-based theories of metaphor comprehension in
which figurative expression implicitly signals underlying literal communication which must
be uncovered by processes distinct from those employed in literal language comprehension.
Schematic representations, on the other hand, generally lead to more fiexible, interaction-
based theories of metaphor comprehension in which figurative expression is processed in a
manner consonant with literal language comprehension. Both forms of theory continue to
fiourish in the psychological literature, although perhaps with different promise. According
to Ortony et al. (1978) "one shortcoming of almost all the research ... is that the locus
of a metaphor is assumed to lie in a word, or perhaps an expression, within a sentence.
If research is to progress it will be necessary to adopt a less restrictive account of what a
metaphor is" (p. 937). In particular, if theories of metaphorical and analogical reasoning
are to extend to more far-reaching issues of learning and creative thought, more fiexible,
open-ended accounts of metaphor comprehension might be preferred.
5.2.3. Studies of problem solving
It is hardly surprising that analogical reasoning in problem solving heis been and
continues to be an area of vigorous research in cognitive psychology. The use of analogy in
complex problem solving is frequently advocated (Newell, 1983), although with relatively
little guidance as to how such reasoning skills are to be developed. In addition, transfer of
problem solving skills beyond the temporally-limited experiences available during training
forms the central purpose of most educational curricula, and a clear understanding of how
to facilitate appropriate transfer while minimizing negative (or inappropriate) transfer is
an obvious goal. Finally, as with continued study of proportional analogical reasoning,
the use of analogies in problem solving is assumed to be an important contributor to
intelligence in general. Since a large body of research has accumulated, this section will
give a brief overview of studies of analogical transfer in problem solving, examining selected
studies in detail to highlight current research issues. The interested reader is referred to
existing reviews of the transfer literature related to problem solving, especially Novick
(1985), Brown and Campione (1985), Brown, Bransford, Ferrara and Campione (1983),
and Lester (1982).
From an abstract vantage point, aspects of analogical reasoning in problem solving
appear quite similar to generalized components discussed in previous sections: given a
target problem to solve, the subject recognizes and retrieves an appropriate source solution
method, eventually applying that method to solve the original target problem. The
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benefits of analogy in problem solving are (perhaps) obvious: by retrieving an applicable
solution approach, previous problem solving efforts can be pressed into service without
the necessity of "starting from scratch" for either superficial problem variants or genuinely
novel problems. Given the apparent flexibility of human reasoning, we might even assume
the necessity of analogy in surviving a changing environment. The costs incurred through
use of analogy in problem solving, however, may be less obvious. Effort expended in
recognizing a novel target problem as an instance of a known problem class or in adapting
a retrieved solution method to the idiosyncrasies of the target situation might exceed the
effort required for solving the problem "from scratch." Perhaps worse, the problem solver
might be led astray by devoting resources to a "false analogy," which appears promising
at retrieval but proves inappropriate as a solution strategy for the target problem.
Conditions under which the recognition, retrieval and application of a source occur,
unfortunately, have yet to be adequately understood. Returning to the abstract char
acterization developed in the last paragraph, we find that a researcher is quickly faced
with providing hypothetical answers to a number of important and much more specific
questions.
1. What is it that subjects understand about a "target problem?" What aspects of the
problem do they attend to in forming a problemrepresentation? This representation
must play a crucial role in recognizing and then using an applicable source.
2. What constitutes a "source problem?" Do specific problem cases or more abstract
solution methods (or both) serve eis a sources for analogical reasoning?
3. At what point during problem solving do subjects recognize the partial similarity
between their understanding of the target problem and source situation(s)? Do
analogies arise at problem solving "impasses" or are they integrated more smoothly
into routine reasoning?
While most researchers make some commitment to one or more of these questions, none
have been answered convincingly. Successful transfer of problem solving skills appears to
be sensitive to a number of factors, including characteristics of the problem solver, the
problem solving task and the immediate setting in which reasoning occurs.
Early investigations of analogy use in problem solving were equivocal with regard to
the frequency with which subjects spontaneously show positive transfer from previously
experienced problems. Research with relatively formal "puzzle problems" (e.g., the Towers
of Hanoi) suggested that positive transfer did occur (Hayes and Simon, 1977; Luger and
Bauer, 1978) but was dependent upon problem difficulty and the order in which problem
variants were presented. Unfortunately, despite the formal specification of reasoning tasks
within an information processing framework, these studies do not arrive at convincing
accounts of which problem solving processes contribute to transfer or what aspects of
competence are actually transferred. Transfer in these studies is typically measured as a
reduction in the time required to solve a problem or the number of problem states entered
during a solution attempt. In neither case do the results show how symmetries between
problem isomorphs are noticed, retrieved or utilized. Instead, they serve as evidence that
some form of transfer can occur, even on problem solving tasks which subjects are assumed
never to have seen before entering the experimental setting. In some ways, it is surprising
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that any transfer at all can be observed under conditions in which subjects can be assumed
to be novices in both the source and target domains for problem solving. This is a recurring
problem in much of the available literature.
Some recent studies of analogy in problem solving, while not much more specific about
knowledge attributable to subjects, do give a more suggestive picture of the circumstances
under which analogies between source and target domains might be recognized and used.
We will examine the work of three researchers in some depth, particularly because they
provide divergent theoretical accounts of analogical reasoning in problem solving.
Analogy as structure mapping
Centner (1982, 1983a) provides a structure mapping theory for analogy (taken to
subsume metaphor, simile and model) which relies on a syntzictic mapping of domain
structure from source (or base) to target. These theoretical concepts will be presented
before a discussion of empirical findings. As a representation. Centner assumes that
domain knowledge is partitioned into objects and predicates. Objects form the basal
level for a particular reasoning context, although at a more detailed level of reasoning they
could be further decomposed into constituent objects and predicates in a recursive fashion.
Predicates may be either unary "attributes" or n-ary "relations." Taking objects or other
predicates as arguments, relations are combined in a propositional network. Centner
(1983a) makes strong claims for the importance of this structuredrepresentation, arguing
that simple attributive predications (e.g., features) cannot account for judgements of
nonliteral similarity crucial to analogical reasoning. In addition, the syntactic specification
of this representation is not taken to be either arbitrary or logically complete. Rather,
these representational assumptions are offered as a model of "the way people construe a
situation" (Centner, 1983a, p. 157).
The basis for analogical reasoning in Centner's theory is a "non-literal similarity
comparison" between domains. The comparison results in a mapping, M, of nodes from
source to target domains which is constructed so that much of the relational structure
of the source domain is "true" in the target domain. That is, identical correspondence
at some level of relational abstraction is possible. This latter condition is qualified by
a "systematicity principle" requiring that corresponding relational structure involve few
attribute predicates and many "higher-order" predicates (i.e., predicates which take yet
other relations as their arguments). With respect to the use of analogies in scientific
theorizing and explanation (Centner, 1982), a good explanatory analogy for scientific
purposes maps few attributes and many relations (particularly those participating in
higher-order or systematic conceptualizations) from source to target domains. While
described syntactically with respect to a structured representation of domain knowledge.
Centner's structure mapping theory implicitly attempts to capture semantic aspects of
causality and constraint which can be used in a predictive fashion in a new domain.
Centner (1982) develops a rich descriptive vocabularyfor explanatory analogies which
is worth discussing here. A number of internal characteristics of an analogy are described:
1. clarity speaks to the precision of object correspondence, both in terms of a single
object mapping to multiple objects in another domain and those multiple objects in
the mapping range being relationally heterogeneous (either situation reduces clarity);
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2. richness refers to the nuraber of mappable relations per object;
3. systematicity describes the extent to which mapped relations participate in higher-
order relations forming "mutually constraining conceptual systems;"
4. and abstractness refers to the hierarchical level (relative to contextual knowledge)
from which mapped relations are drawn.
External characteristics of explanatory analogies include:
1. base specificity refers to the reasoner's degree of explicit knowledge of the source
domain;
2. validity describes the verifiability of imported relations in the target domain;
3. and scope describes the applicability of a source analog across a variety of specific
targets.
Gentner argues for a tradeoff between scope, clarity and richness in explanatory
analogies, claiming that an analogy which is wide in scope while mapping a rich density
of relations is difficult to achieve without allowing object and predicate correspondence to
"slide about." Effective analogies for scientific explication and prediction are described as
being high in scope, clarity and abstractness but low in richness. "Expressive" metaphors
intended for descriptive or evocative purposes, on the other hand, axe described as being
high in richness for lowerlevel relations but lower in clarity and systematicity. Empirically,
subjects rate good scientific analogies as being high in clarity but low in richness, while
good expressive analogies are rated high in richness. As additional supporting evidence
(Gentner, 1983a), subjects' interpretations of analogies contain more relational than at
tributive assertions, and subjects rate as most apt those analogies richest in mappable
relations.
As noted by others (Carrol and Mack, 1982), Gentner's theoretical model of analogical
reasoning is sparse with respect to explicit process specification. Aside from predicting the
differing utility of two analogies for explanatory purposes, the structure mapping theory
stops short of providing a framework for understanding when or how analogies might be
spontaneously recognized and used while problem solving. Nonetheless, some hypotheses
are evident in Gentner's writing.
In relation to recognition and retrieval, an "analogical shift conjecture" is offered
(Gentner, 1983a; Forbus and Gentner, 1983, 1986) as a stage model of the spontaneous
comparisons that might occur as a subject acquires skill in a new domain. Central to this
model is the hypothesis that accessibility of a source in memory is inversely related to its
utility for reasoning in the target domain. The first stage predominantly consists of "literal
similarity matches" involving correspondence of both object descriptions and relational
structure. As a result of considerable overlap, access to the source is predicted to be
relatively easy, perhaps through multiple paths of activation during retrieval. In contrast,
utility of the retrieved source should be low since there will be too much overlap for the
subject to judge the causal relevance of various aspects of the source. At the second stage,
subjects are able to recognize analogies involving few object mappings but considerable
relational overlap. Access to an analogous source might be more difficult since object
matching does not contribute to activation, but utility of the retrieved analogy should be
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higher since the shared structure between source and target is "sparse enough to permit
analysis" (1983a, p. 168). In the final stage, subjects are assumed to have formed "general
laws" within the domain which consist almost entirely of abstract relational structures.
Hence, subjects are able to notice and apply these laws when confronted with new (target)
situations. Access in this third stage is not described, while utility is assumed to be high
across different domains (scope). In overview, novices in a problem solving domain rely on
literally similar, previously experienced problem solving episodes, while more experienced
problem solvers utilize analogies and eventually are able to apply general laws. Thus
recognition is primarily a function of the reasoner's experience in a problem domain.
While little empiricalevidence is yet available for the stage modelof learning, Centner
and Landers (1985) have examined the infiuence ofstructural similarity on recall ofprevi
ously experienced stories. Subjects read a set of stories during a training condition and at
test (six to eight days later) were asked to report any remindings of trainingstories which
occurred while reading target stories. Subjects were asked to write down the stories they
were reminded of as accurately as possible. The stories presented at test were designed to
bear different structural similarity to each of the training (source) stories. When written
accounts of recalled stories were compared with the given target stories, results showed
decreasing likelyhood of access for sources which were:
1. "mere appearance" matches (similar objects and first-order predicates),
2. "true analogies" (similar first and higher-order predicates),
3. or "false analogies" (similar only in first-order predicates).
Although subjects report recalling superficially similar sources most readily, their ratings
of the appropriateness of thesesource stories after recall favor the "true analogy" matches.
Thus access to a source in memory may be facilitated by surface level similarity, but
subjects are later able to recognize structurally similar remindings as being most apt,
suggesting that the utility of a retrieved source may be determined by similarity at a more
systematic (structural) level. While suggestive in terms ofthe shift conjecture, this study
does not examine the effects of subjects' experience in the task domain or the relevance
of problem material in the surrounding reasoning context at training or test. As will be
discussed in the conclusion to this section, both are important considerations for the use
of analogies in problem solving.
Given a source analog. Centner's structure mapping theory places several implicit
constraints on the use of that analog in problem solving. Presumably supporting anal
ogy, the mapping process crucial for identification of effective structural correspondence
is described as what appears to be a parallel yet interdependent identification of object
and relational mappings. To avoid circularity in identifying an appropriatecorrespondence
mapping. Centner restricts predicates to an identical match between source and target.
Nonetheless, the process of extending an initial correspondence mapping given a partic
ular source and target is not clearly specified. Within the prescriptive qualities of good
explanatory analogies, we might expect that subjects would somehow prefer more system
atic aspects of the source analog for extension to the target. Neither is the evaluation of
an existing mapping explicitly addressed, although it is clear that a subject's familiarity
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with the source domain (base specificity) and goals in the target domain would each play
an important role in evaluation.
Use of a given analogy in accordance with the structure mapping theory has been
empirically studied. Centner and Centner (1983) examine problem solving with the
intention of settling the issue of whether structure mapping activities are central to cog
nitive processes in analogical reasoning (termed the "generative analogy hypothesis") or
epiphenomenal in retrospective descriptions of analogical reasoning (dubbed the "surface
terminology hypothesis"). In this study, subjects are presented with either a water reservoir
("flowing waters") or crowd of mice ("teeming crowd") analogy as the basis of instruction
about current flow in electrical circuits. The authors' expectation is that these analogies
will differentially aid in solving progressively more difficult electrical circuit problems.
Hypothesized facilitation of battery problems by the reservoir analogy and resis
tance problems by the crowd analogy are partially confirmed. However, a "generalized
strength-attribute" seems to influence many subjects' performance, suggesting that pre
existing knowledge brought to the experimental task may influence performance as much as
analogies encountered during experimentation. In addition, subjects receiving the flowing
waters model appear to have difficulty in reasoning about how water behaves under grav
itational forces in a closed system, suggesting low "base specificity." In summary, despite
the authors' enthusiasm for the centrality of analogy in problem solving, the reported
experimentation does not clearly support or disconflrm their hypothesis. Hence, although
Centner's structure mapping theory yields promising concepts relating structural aspects
of knowledge representation to a plausible basis for judging explanatory analogies, the
implications of this theory for analogical reasoning in problem solving have yet to be fully
pursued along theoretical and empirical lines.
Analogy as pragmatic induction
An alternative theoretical account of analogical reasoning in problem solving comes
from Holyoak's (1984a; 1984b; 1985; Holland, Holyoak, Nisbett and Thagard, 1985)
treatment of pragmatic aspects of analogical transfer. In opposition to Centner's syntactic
theory of structure mapping guided by systematicity, Holyoak argues strongly for the
necessary influence of the reasoner's goals in exploring an analogy. The gist of Holyoak's
argument is that analogy or any other inductive reasoning mechanism used in problem
solving must constrain the space of possible inferences by using knowledge of the purpose to
which the reasoning mechanism is put. In the case of analogical reasoning, an acontextual
consideration of higher-order relations in the source would be insufficient as a basis for
deciding which of many possible relations should transfer. Instead, Holyoak suggests that
goals and constraints within the target domain, in addition to the surrounding reasoning
context, must be used as a guide for transfer.
Not surprisingly, Holyoak (1984a) sketches a model of problem solving as the sur
rounding context in which analogies are recognized and used. Problem solving depends
upon being able to construct a mental model of the problem situation, refining that model
successively until a concrete solution can be found. The problem model is an abstraction
that preserves properties (e.g., goals, constraints and operators) of the real world problem
which are causally relevant to the modelling purpose. Problems can be solved to the extent
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Figure 3
Analogy as a process of second-order modelling (Holyoak, 1985).
that the problem model enables useful predictions about state chzmges in the represented
world (i.e., the real world problem). Expressed more formally, the problem model is a
homomorphism between represented and representing worlds, and this mapping should
commute if successful predictions are to be obtained. In actuality, models tend to be
quasimorphisms in which mappings between objects, relations and actions in both worlds
cire incomplete. Quasimorphisms are often useful, if not completely accurate in their
predictions. Problem solving, then, is a process of refining the problem model so that a
solution plan can eventually be constructed and applied.
Given a genuinely ill-defined problem, the problem solver is likely to be unable to
generate a solution plan which can be directly applied. When routine problem solving
activities (e.g., forward or backward chaining given a set of problem-specific operators)
reach an impasse, the role of analogy is to provide a refinement of the target problem model
so that a solution plan can be constructed and applied. Analogical reasoning is described
as a second-order modelling process in which a model of the source problem is retrieved
and plciced in correspondence with the incompletely specified model of the target problem
(see Figure 3). State descriptions [S') and a transition function (T') in the target model
are juxtaposed with corresponding elements in the source model by an analogical mapping
(dark arrows at bottom of Figure 3). In the ideal, this process results in an isomorphism
between source and target models, with the solution method effective for the retrieved
source mapped into a solution method for the target problem. In practice, the mapped
solution method may require further refinement.
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To be pragmatic in a theoretical sense, Holyoak's model of analogy in problem solving
should provide hypothetical frameworks for two questions:
1. How are source models recognized and retrieved;
2. How are components of the source model extended into the target to provide model
refinement?
These questions are identical to those considered for Centner's structure mapping theory
discussed in preceding paragraphs.
For recognition and retrieval, Holyoak proposes a summative activation mechanism
in which elements of a "retrieval cue" extracted from the target problem model serve as
origins of activation for elements of a candidate source model. The process of cue extraction
is not specified, but appears to rely on detection of what Holyoak terms an "implicit
schema" refiecting relevant similarities between the target problem and a retrieved source.
Particularly for analogies across problem solving domains (e.g., insight problems, discussed
in a moment), Holyoak argues that retrieval may be quite difficult owing to considerable
superficial dissimilarity between target and source models. He further hypothesizes that
more abstract problem schemata induced over multiple instances of problem solutions will
be more easily retrieved, since these schemata will eliminate many elements of superficial
dissimilarity. Distinctions between surface (superficial) and structural (causally-relevant)
similarities between target and source are used uniformly in Holyoak's writing, but appear
to be context and goal-dependent for particular problem solving episodes. This is an
important point given the pragmatic orientation of Holyoak's approach to analogy in
problem solving.
Retrieval depends upon the cumulative activation of concepts involved in the source
model by pathways originating at corresponding concepts in the target model. Since little is
likely to be known in the target problem model at the outset of problem solving, Holyoak
assumes that initial and goal states are likely to be the primary origins of activation,
particularly as their constituent concepts are inferentially elaborated (e.g., values for
properties are determined). Activation resulting from an assumed focus on the goal
specification of the target model insures that most origins of activation in retrieval will
be goal-relevant. Retrieval of a source model occurs when attention of the problem solver
turns to a sufficiently activated source model. Attentional control, then, appears to be
related to some sort of activation threshold.
Holyoak is less specific about the manner in which aspects of the source model are
extended into the target model. Given that the retrieval process has revealed aspects of the
"implicit schema" between source and target models, an initial mapping will be available
after retrieval, and development of the analogy proceeds by "unpacking" the source model
in a top-down fashion. That is, retrieval provides an initial, high-level mapping between
models (i.e., correspondence between goals and constraints in the problem models) which
guides the incremental extension of information from the source to the target. Extensions
are subject to transformations implied by the mapping between models. Holyoak describes
four types of mapping relations:
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1. Identities are the same in both models, apparently forming part of the implicit
schema. These should correspond to surface and structural similarities between
models.
2. Indeterminate correspondences have yet to be mapped.
3. Structure-preserving differences do not impair causal structure in either model and
do not impede construction of operators in the target model. These correspond to
surface dissimilarities between models.
4. Structure-violating differences do impair operator construction in the target model
and may require introduction of new objects or relations not present in either model.
These correspond to structural dissimilarities between models.
In summary, mapping and extension processes in Holyoak's theory appear to be
guided by the goal-relevaJice of various model components in both the target and source
models. Refinement of existing operators in the target model serves as the impetus
for retrieval through spreading activation, and attempts to map and transfer applicable
operators from source to target models appear to dominate the process of analogical
reasoning during extension (hence the term, "unpacking"). Analogical reasoning is but
one mechanism in the larger context of problem solving by model refinement, and may
"run dry" as structure-violating differences between models begin to predominate in the
incrementally extended mapping. This would appear to leave open the possibility of other,
supporting inductive mechanisms in problem solving, a possibility discussed more fully in
Holland, et al. (1985).
Holyoak and others (Gick and Holyoak, 1980, 1983; Holyoak, Junn and Billman,
1984; Holyoak and Koh, 1985) have undertaken ambitious empirical studies of analogical
transfer in solving "insight" problems. As an example, consider the following problem,
originally proposed by Duncker (1945).
Suppose you are a doctor faced with a patient who has a malignant tumor in his
stomach. It is impossible to operate on the patient, but unless the tumor is destroyed
the patient will die. There is a kind of ray that at a sufficiently high intensity can
destroy the turrior. Unfortunately, at this intensity the healthy tissue that the rays
pass through on the way to the tumor will also be destroyed. At lower intensities the
rays are harmless to healthy tissue, but will not affect the tumor either. How can
the rays be used to destroy the tumor without injuring the healthy tissue?
Such problems have a long history in the psychological literature, ajid are typically assumed
to require some amount of creativity in achieving a problem solution. The basic experimen
tal paradigm employed by Holyoak and his associates is to present novice problem solvers
with a variety of source problems in the context of training (generally a story comprehen
sion task), and then to measure the extent to which subjects are able to transfer problem
solving strategies from these training materials to a novel problem presented during later
testing. Thus, if the problem shown above were presented at test, subjects might have seen
a structurally similar problem during training which involved a military leader wishing to
overcome a fortress but unable to send his entire army over mined roads leading to the
26
fortress. A solution in both cases would be to subdivide the attacking forces (rays or army)
and have them converge on the central target (tumor or fortress).
Although Holyoak and associates present the results of numerous experimental ma
nipulations within this basic paradigm, only selected results will be discussed here. Few
subjects (10%) give a convergence solution to the radiation problem alone (without train
ing); 30% spontaneously give the convergence solution having seen the military problem
duriiig training; and a total of 75% give the convergence solution having seen the military
problem at training and given a hint to use the training problem in generating a solu
tion. These ascending figures are cumulative over conditions (no training, training but no
hint, training and hint). Thus, as with transfer experiments mentioned earlier, unassisted
transfer from a given source problem appears infrequently, but subjects are able to use the
source once it is explicitly pointed out to them.
Of more interest in the experiments reported by Holyoak and associates are explicit
manipulations intended to alter the facility with which subjects can access and use a source
analog. In terms of access, two general forms of manipulation are reported. First, the
problem materials presented at training and test are systematically varied by their surface
and structural similarity to one another. Holyoak and Koh (1985) describe experiments
in which variations of a "laser and light bulb" problem are used as training (source)
materials for the subsequent solution of the radiation problem at test. Briefiy, the source
problem requires that the damaged filament of an expensive light bulb be repaired by a
laser without damaging the surrounding, fragile glass bulb. Surface similarity was varied
by constructing problems in which a laser or an ultrasound device were the instrument of
repair. A laser was assumed superficially more similar to the radiation device mentioned
in the target problem than was the ultrasound generating device. Structural similarity was
varied by introducing different forms of constraint in the source problem: either a fragile
surrounding medium (glass) for the bulb or multiple generating devices, each without
sufficient power to effect repair. The surrounding medium constraint was assumed more
similar to the radiation problem (fragile surrounding tissues) than was the insufficiency of.
a single generating device. Crossing surface and structural variations of similarity (each
high or low) gives four source problems for training purposes. These were given to four
different groups of subjects, each of which was subsequently asked to solve the radiation
problem.
Results of this experiment are consonant with Holyoak's model of retrieval discussed
earlier: the high surface and structural similarity source is spontaneously used in a suc
cessful convergence solution by 69% of experimental subjects; transfer is lowered if either
surface or structural similarity is reduced (38% and 33%, respectively); and with low
similarity at both surface and structural levels only 13% of subjects achieve a convergence
solution. Thus, any reduction in similarity (whether surface or structural) appears to
interfere with spontaneous retrieval and use of an available source.
However, while surface dissimilarity might inhibit spontaneous retrieval, the theo
retical account of retrieval discussed earlier suggests that subjects should best be able
to retrieve a source when surface level aspects have been abstracted out of the encoded
memory (e.g., by eliminative induction) and only structural aspects remain for summative
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activation. This hypothesis is partially confirmed in another series of experiments. As a
second manipulation intended to influence retrieval, Gick and Holyoak (1983) requiredsub
jects to give summaries describing important similarities among multiple source problems
presented at training (e.g., multiple problems solvable with a convergence strategy). In the
process of summarization, it was hypothesized that subjects would generate an abstract
problem schema, commit that schema to memory, and then be more likely to retrieve
the schema than the original source problems from which the schema was induced. In
actuality, summarization over two sources resulted in 45% of subjects giving a convergence
solution without receiving a hint to use the source problems or schema. Further aids to
summarization (a spatial diagram or a verbal summary given by the experimentor) gave
a slight increase in spontaneous transfer (57% and 62% respectively). Furthermore, when
subject's summaries were rated for quality, 91% of those subjects giving "good" summaries
were able to produce the convergence solution without a hint. Thus, the summarization
condition over two analogs appeared to increase the frequency with which subjects sponta
neously transfer above baseline levels mentioned earlier (30% for a single source problem).
Interestingly, the authors found little benefit in giving a summarization directly to subjects
without requiring them to construct their own.
The two manipulation strategies described above also appear to have predictable
effects on the use of a source, given that its retrieval has been assured by providing the
subject a hint to use it. In Holyoak and Koh's (1985) study, for example, the percentage
of subjects achieving a convergence solution given a hint to use the source problem was
78% for the high structural similarity condition (fragile surrounding glass) but only 54%
for the low structural similarity condition (insufficient intensity of a single generating
device). These percentages are collapsed across the surface similarity condition which has
a negligable effect on achieving a correct solution given a hint. The authors conclude, in
accordance with Holyoak's theoretical treatment, that surface similarity may play a more
important role in spontaneous retrieval of a source than in its application once retrieved.
In overview, empirical support for Holyoak's pragmatic theory of analogical trans
fer in problem solving is substantial although in some ways nonspecific. Spontaneous
generation of expected solution types for target insight problems having been exposed to
structurally similar source problems appears to occur infrequently. However, the frequency
with which subjects are able to generate such solutions can be affected by a variety of
manipulations in both the problem solving task (e.g., requiring that subjects summarize
multiple source problems at training) and in problem materials (i.e., systematic variation
of surface and structural similarity between target and source). In studies with 4-to-
6 yeaj-old and 11 year-old children using age-appropriate insight problems (e.g.. Miss
Piggy transporting some precious jewels), Holyoak, Junn and Billman (1984) have found
similar results for spontaneous transfer and effects attributable to variations in similarity
between target and source problems. Although primarily quantitative results have been
discussed above, Holyoak and associates also provide convergent qualitative evidence based
on examination of verbal and written protocols collected while subjects participated in the
experiments. Taken together, these varied results are encouraging, although the theory and
supporting evidence fall short of specifying the precise nature of retrieval, mapping or ap
plication of a source problem model to achieve solution of a target problem. Construction
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Ateirgetproblemforexperts(Clement,1983)
ofasecond-orderisomorphismasameansofmodelrefinementprovidesaninteresting
abstractionforproblemsolvingbyiinalogy,butmuchworkremains.
Analogiesusedbyexpertproblemsolvers
Incontrastwithrelativelynaivesubjectsusedintheprevioustwoprojects,Clement
(1981,1982)describestheuseofanalogyinproblemsolvingbyasmallsample(10
subjects)selectedonthebasisofcreativeproblemsolvingskillsintechnicalfields(5
physicists,oneaNobellaureate;3mathematicians;2computerscientists).Subjectswere
presentedwithadifficultphysicsproblem(seeFigure4)andwereencouragedto"think
aloud"whileattemptingasolution.Incontrastwithretrievedanalogiesimplicatedin
previousstudies,itappearsthatClement'ssubjectsspontaneouslygeneratemanysource
problems,perhapsunderheuristiccontrol.Spontaneoususeofanalogiesoccursin70%
ofthesesubjects.Forexample,manysubjectsreportspontaneouslygeneratingeither
simplerversionsofthespringproblem(e.g.,uncoilingthespringandtestingitselasticity
bybending)orretrievingstructurallysimilarproblemsinquitedifferentdomains(e.g.,
complicatedchemicalstructures).Similarreasoningstrategieshavebeenobservedin
experts'solutionattemptsonarelativelydifficultmathematicalproblem(Clement,1984).
Onthebasisofextensiveprotocolanalysis,Clementarguesforaprocessmodelofanalogical
reasoningconsistingoffourcomponents:
1.generatingananalogousproblem.
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2. confirming key relations between analogous problems,
3. comprehending the generated analog at a level of detail enabling predictions,
4. and transferring both predictions and general knowledge (e.g., key relations or a
method of attack) from source to target problems.
The latter three of these processes are described as occurring in any order and, rather
than leading to a solution instantaneously, problem solving using analogies is described
as a difficult, time-consuming process akin to scientific theory formation and verification.
As with the previous two research projects, Clement's work can be examined in terms of
access to an analogical source (item 1, above) and its subsequent use (items 2 through 4,
above).
Clement (1983) describes three mechanisms for access to a source analog, each of
which is seen with differing frequency in his sample of expert problem solvers. These in
clude: generative transformation" of the existing problem representation to give a novel
but simpler problem, retrieval of an analogy by "associative leaps" to a more familiar
domain, and identification of an analogous problem via a shared "abstract principle."
Detailed examination of analogies evident in verbal protocols shows that subjects most
often generate an analogous case (59% of salient analogies were of this type), less fre
quently retrieve an analogous case through an "associative leap" (25% of this type), and
infrequently retrieve an abstract principle which subsumes an analogous case (3% of this
type).
Clement's characterization of these analogy types is interesting in that it documents
purposeful or strategic generation of analogous cases, in contrast to the implicit or un
intentional model of access to analogies evident in the accounts of Centner or Holyoak
(see previous sections). The deliberate character of recognition or access is quite clear in
subjects verbalizations during problem solving, even for analogies retrieved by associative
leaps:
I feel as though I'm reasoning in circles and I think I'll make a deliberate effort to
break out of the circle somehow... what else stretches... like rubber bands, molecules,
polyesters... (Clement, 1983, p. 13).
Clement does offer hypothetical explanations of how the intentional search for a source
problem might occur. Intentional retrieval by an associative leap is described as requiring
the subject to attend to salient aspects of the target problem (e.g., relations which are
involved in causal constraints onthe solution, like stretching). In this case, heeded relations
should serve as originsof activation within memory, and candidate source cases whichshare
these relations may reach an active state. Generation of a source problem, in contrast, is
described as requiring the subject to attend to and intentionally alter presumably fixed
aspects ofthe target problem (e.g., the number ofcoils). In this case, the altered problem
is often simpler than the original. Aspects of the altered problem then serve as the origin
of memory activation which may result in known solution methods for the simpler problem
being retrieved by virtue of reaching an active state.
While interesting, Clement's proposals for access in the various analogy types are
underspecified: he suggests increasing activation as a retrieval mechanism but falls short
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of any commitment to the representational structures held by expert problem solvers in
his sample. Thus, distinctions between abstractions, experienced or generated problem
cases, and associated solution strategies are difficult to evaluate. It is far from clear what
subjects can be assumed to know about in the task domain, or whether different forms of
knowledge might be differently accessible.
Clement also describes the manner in which expert problem solvers might use an
existing analogy. Two subprocesses contribute to confirmation of an analogy (item 2,
above). First, "key relationships" between the source and target are determined by an
unspecified matching process which is apparently sensitive to problem-relevant areas of
structural correspondence. Second, these relationships can be evaluated by using "bridging
analogies" intermediate between the target and source problems. As an example of such a
bridge, Clement (1982) describes a subject who evaluates the analogous stretching relation
between the spring (target) and rod (source) by generating a third situation in which the
spring has square coils (a bridging analogy). This allows the subject to qualify the partial
similarity of stretching in the rod and the helical spring by noticing the importance of
twisting as a contributor to how the spring actually works.
Comprehension of an existing analogy (item 3) may be facilitated by generation and
confirmation of "extension analogies" or "extreme cases." In either case, the subject is
faced with a new problem (the source) which resists understanding. Extension analogies
are a recursive application of analogical reasoning to aid understanding of a poorly un
derstood source, effectively treating that source as a new target problem; extreme cases
are simplifications of a troublesome source by considering key problem components in the
limiting case. As an example of an extreme case to aid in comprehension of the bending
rod analogy, one of Clement's subjects generated a case in which the bending rod was
very short, reasoning through physical intuition that an extremely short rod would bend
very little. These findings suggest that multiple analogies are regularily used by expert
problem solvers, forming chains of analogical inference which lend support to a line of
reasoning which develops over time. Hence, problem solutions by analogy are not derived
instantaneously but must be achieved with some effort by subjects.
In summary, Clement presents a description of analogical reasoning in problem solv
ing that is compelling not only for suggestive process specification but also for its basis
in non-trivial problem solving at expert levels of performance. As suggested by Centner
(1983a), increasing expertise in a problem solving domain may be strongly interrelated
with subjects' abilities to access and use analogies for problem solving. Juxtaposed with
studies of problem solving by assumed novices in which spontaneous successful use of
analogies may be infrequent (Gick and Holyoak, 1980, 1983; Centner and Centner, 1983),
Clement's finding that a majority of experts make liberal use of varied analogies is entic
ing. Since Clement's subjects were presumably experts at the time of testing, it would be
very interesting to examine the role of analogies in problem solving as that expertise was
acquired. This is the gist of Centner's (1983a) analogical shift conjecture.
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Analogies in problem solving: some conclusions
Looking back over introductory materials and the three research programs discussed
in preceding sections, a natural division can be drawn between access to candidate analog
ical sources and their use. In turn, access and use appear to be sensitive to individual and
situational factors which have been partially addressed by different research projects. We
are now in a position to attempt a summarization of psychological studies of analogical
transfer in problem solving.
Regarding access to or recognition of a source analog, it is important to distinguish be
tween accounts of how retrieval takes place and what is actually retrieved. In the abstract,
studies examined above concur over how successful retrieval of an analogical source takes
place: heeded aspects of the target problem serve to activate similar aspects of candidate
sources in long-term memory, resulting in one or more of these sources reaching an active
state for consideration in further problem solving. Conceivably, the memory mechanisms
which underly such retrieval could be considered invariant over subjects, tasks and rea
soning contexts. Variety in problem solving performance, then, would be attributable to
knowledge possessed by subjects or task characteristics, rather than to underlying retrieval
mechanisms. This seems a reasonable assumption, although even within invariant memory
mechanisms a clearer specification of supporting memory structures (e.g., the representa
tional grain of a convergence case or schema) and the processes which act upon them (e.g.,
spreading activation) would be both interesting and useful.
With regard to what in the target is heeded by subjects as the process of retrieval
begins, consensus among researchers abruptly stops. A major distinction, made particu
larly clear by Clement's work, is between passive and active accounts of attending to the
target problem statement. Centner's structure mapping account appears the most passive,
with ajiy aspect of the target problem representation potentially contributing to activa
tion of a candidate source. This passive account of heeding appears to have some support
from the prompted recall experiments with related stories mentioned earlier (Centner and
Landers, 1985). Holyoak's focus on the pragmatics of analogy in problem solving provides
an intermediate point of contrast on this passive/active continuum for heeding. According
to Holyoak's summative activation account of retrieval, consideration of goal-relevant as
pects of the target problem representation gives disproportionate activational "weight" to
contextually salient aspects of candidate sources. Thus, the problem solving context itself
provides constraints on what will be heeded in the target. This differs from what Holyoak
describes as a context-free examination of problem representations in Centner's structure
mapping approach. As a final point of contrast, Clement documents what appears to be
purposeful consideration of key relations (e.g., stretching) in the target problem. This
include alteration of fixed relations (e.g., the number of coils in a spring) in an effort to
recall previously experienced problems or to generate a simpler problem variation for which
a known solution method might apply. It is important to understand that the distinction
being made here is between active or passive consideration of the target problem with or
without the intention of retrieving a candidate source: the actual retrieval mechanism in
all three accounts (spreading activation) is the same.
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As mentioned before, variation in what subjects attend to in the target problem
representation likely depends upon their sophistication in the problem solving domain.
This sophistication may take many forms, including the general store of knowledge about
the domain, a conceptual vocabulary which supports effective abstraction of problem-
specific details, or even problem solving confidence. This is made clear by contrasting
Clement's description of expert problem solvers with findings from other research with
relatively naive problem solvers. Additional evidence is provided by studies which contrast
behaviors of experts and novices in problem categorization and problem solving for a
particular domain. For example, studies in the domains of physics (Chi, Feltovich and
Glaser, 1981; Larkin, 1982) and mathematics (Schoenfeld and Herrmann, 1982) have
shown systematic differences in the representations used by subjects with different abilities.
Experts appear to use more abstract representational terms which are associated with
general solution strategies, while novices appear more attentive to superficial aspects of
a presented problem. Thus, a plausible but abstract explanation for why expert problem
solvers make more frequent and fiexible use of analogies is that they are better able to
attend to relevant information in the target problem and represent it in a fashion which
makes activation of appropriate sources in memory more likely. This is somewhat in
contrast with Holyoak's advocacy of schema induction to facilitate access and largely
consistent with Centner's analogical shift conjecture. Unfortunately, little is known about
how representational differences between novice and expert problem solvers develop.
Having outlined a framework for how access might occur at test, we can now con
sider what a problem solver might be able to retrieve. Unfortunately, the issue of what
is retrieved is often blurred in the studies examined above. For example, finding that
spontaneous noticing of a military source presented at training occurs infrequently, Gick
and Holyoak (1983) require a summarization task of their subjects and report facilitation
of spontaneous retrieval at test. While some facilitative effect seems clear, it is not clear
what subjects are actually retrieving in their problem solving efforts after the summa
rization task: one of the original military stories, an abstracted "schema" based on those
stories, or even a reasoning set which encourages abstraction over recalled concrete in
stances. Plausible accounts of transfer could be constructed for any of the three situations.
Clement's descriptive results (1983), although collected under different circumstances (i.e.,
no training manipulation) and within a different subject population, suggest that varied
materials may be retrieved from long-term memory, if not generated directly through
heuristic reasoning strategies.
Again, sophistication in the problem solving domain offers some explanation for in
dividual differences in accessing a relevant source. In addition to heeding and representing
relevant problem information, it appears likely that proficient problem solvers have a wider
store of better organized problem solving experiences available in memory. Although this
assertion is something ofa truism (i.e., more knowledge leads to better performance), there
is evidence for the psychological reality of "problem schemata" possessed byproficient prob
lem solvers and the influence of these schemata on subjects' problem solving performance.
For example, Hinsley, Hayes and Simon (1977) and Mayer, Larkin and Kadane (1984) give
evidence for the psychological importance of problem schemata in the domain of algebra
"word" or "story" problems typical ofthe mathematics curriculum insecondary schooling.
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In brief, these studies show that proficient problem solvers can reliably group problems
by type; categorization of a problem by type occurs before solution; solution methods
are associated with types and are used to solve problems (this association constitutes a
schema); and some subjects are able to use schemata to solve superficially dissimilar prob
lems. Problem schemata, while certainly not the only possibility for an effective analogical
source, offer what could be a bridging knowledge structure developmentally intermediate
between specific problem solving cases and more abstract principles. This possibility was
briefly explored in the preceding discussion of Centner's analogical shift conjecture.
As a final contributor for understanding effective access to source analogs, task
specific factors should be considered. The distinction between training and test in many
of the studies described in previous sections has implications which extend beyond the
experimental manipulations used in those studies. Since candidate sources are encoded
at training time (or during instruction or practice in a real-world setting), the extent to
which the situation at test is comparable to training conditions should play an important
role in facilitating or inhibiting effective access. In addition to evidence already discussed
(Holyoak and Koh, 1985; Gentner and Landers, 1985), Ross (1982) has shown both positive
and negative trzinsfer as a result of systematic variation in task materials at training and
test. Training and test comparability can be determined at many levels, including not
only representational similarity of presented problems, but alsosimilarity in the reasoning
and motivational contexts across situations. Thus it seems reasonable to assume that
instating a story comprehension task at training but a problem solving task at test might
yield different spontaneous transfer than if a similar task were used in both situations.
Systematic variations in reasoning contexts were not undertaken in the studies examined
in previous sections. In general, effective access at test must overcome whatever encoding
specificity is retained from the training context (Tulving and Thomson, 1973; Norman and
Bobrow, 1979). Again, subjects' sophistication in the problem domain(s) might influence
what they attend to in the problem statement (at training or test) as well as what might
be available for access at test. Clement's finding that experts strategically manipulate
problem materials in an apparent effort to recall applicable cases is suggestivefor proficient
problem solving at test; the effectiveness of Gick and Holyoak's requirement that subjects
summarize multiple source problems is suggestive for similar strategies during training.
Thus, the undesirable effects of encoding specificity might be overcome either at test
(during retrieval) or at training (during encoding).
Again, considering access from the vantage of how retrieval occurs and what is
retrieved, a general perspective on access to source analogs is possible. Whether a problem
solver does retrieve a source and what that source consists of will depend upon several
issues.
1. The mechanism through which retrieval arises plays an important, but possibly
invariant role in supporting the influence of other factors.
2. How the subject attends to the target problem statement will determine the focus for a
memory retrieval process. Heeding irrelevant information in the target or representing
heeded information in an overly specific fashion reduces the likelihood of retrieving
a relevant source - a dilemma which may be avoided by more sophisticated subjects.
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3. What is available for retrieval in the subject's long-term memory obviously delimits
what might be retrieved. Availability depends upon the scope of a subject's previous
experience and the manner in which those experiences were committed to memory.
4. The degree to which reasoning contexts match at training and test can exert a
faxrilitative or inhibitory influence on effective access. Subjects' reasoning strategies
at either time may serve to mediate the influence of context matching.
Assuming that subjects can access a source analog, we still must account for the
conditions under which subjects are able to use the retrieved source. As with accounts of
access, there seems to be general agreement over how a retrieved analog might be used:
access yields aji initial partial mapping between source and target, and this mapping is
incrementally extended subject to the demands of the target problem. This extension could
be described as a process of hypothesis formation and confirmation. A relation known to
be true in the source is hypothesized to exist in the target, and inferential activities in the
target serve to confirm or disconfirm this hypothesis. Again, the distinction between how
a source is used and what that source consists of is important and will be mediated by
subject and situational factors.
In considering how extension and confirmation of a mapping might occur. Centner's
(1982) notion of base specificity is clearly a relevant subject factor. If systematicity (or
causal-relevance) is to dominate analogical reasoning, subjects must possess systematic
knowledge of the source domain and (as in Holyoak's pragmatic orientation) be able to
choose aspects of this knowledge for extension to the target domain. Thus, subjects must
have an adequate understanding of the source if transfer is to be expected: retrieving
another ill-specified problem when faced with difficulties in an existing target problem
will not be very productive. Some evidence for this situation may be found in Centner and
Centner's (1983) description of subjects' attempts to use either a fluid or crowd analogy
in reasoning about electrical circuits. Without clearly understanding how fluids behave
in a closed system which is influenced by gravitational forces, it is not surprising that
some subjects find it difficult to transfer predicted behaviors from the fluids domain into
the target circuit problems. Clement's (1981, 1982) description of experts' use of bridging
analogies, extension analogies and extreme cases to support their understanding of relations
in the source domain suggests that a clear understanding of the source requires effort even
from quite sophisticated problem solvers.
Lest understanding of the source be over-emphasized, we should also note the impor
tance of having a sufficient understanding of the target problem domain so that particular
relations in the source can be selected as relevant hypotheses and then confirmed. This
corresponds roughly to Holyoak's notion of purpose in using an analogy: consideration
of many possibly relevant relations in the source is constrained by attention to relevant
but troublesome aspects of the target problem. Beyond providing selective bias, some
understanding of the target domain must also be assumed if extended relations (hypothe
ses) are to be confirmed. Thus a relation which has some explanatory or predictive force
in the source problem must be verified within the confines of the target problem, a pro
cess which presupposes a subject's ability to judge the validity of imported relations. In
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Holyoak's terminology (1984a), this corresponds to subjects' capacities for distinguish
ing between mapped relations which are identities, structure-preserving differences or
structure-violating differences.
This leads to a paradoxical situation: subjects must have a reasonable understanding
of their goals in the target problem and the constraints surrounding those goals if a re
trieved source is to be effectively used. We might wonder why, if subjects must understand
the target problem so well, analogical reasoning is required at all? This apparent paradox
is less troublesome after considering the circumstances under which analogies are used in
problem solving. As Holyoak (1984a) suggests, problem solvers may reach an impasse
in their attempts to generate a reasonable solution in the target problem, even though
they may possess sufficient knowledge to recognize or verify a reasonable solution plan
if it were available. Considering the extent of subjects' knowledge of the target problem
domain, Clement's work is once again instructive by showing that even highly sophisticated
problem solvers make frequent use of analogies when confronted by a sufficiently difficult
target problem. It is clear that Clement's subjects understand the spring problem in suf
ficient detail that they can identify salient problem components (e.g., "stretching" or the
number of coils in a spring). They use these judgments as the basis for an active process of
analogical reasoning: they produce hypotheses about qualitative and quantitative aspects
of the target by considering better understood relations in a source, and then attempt to
confirm or disconfirm those hypotheses by determining whether supportive reasoning in
the source is also true in the target.
If analogical reasoning in problem solving is to be understood as a process of hypoth
esis generation and testing, what is retrieved as a source is again of primary importance.
Hypotheses available through context-relevant consideration of a retrieved source will vary
in abstraction and possible utility (Centner's notions of scope and validity) as a function
of what the reasoner retrieves: problem-specific cases (either from the same or differ
ent conceptual domains), problem schemata or abstractions developed over experience
with many specific cases, or principles which may be domain independent. According to
Holyoak (1984b) there may be some tradeoff between accessibility and utility of a source,
with abstract schemata being more easily accessible than specific cases but possibly less
powerful when applied within the confines of a specific target problem. Centner (1983a)
argues from the other side of the abstraction spectrum that specific cases may be too
complicated to permit "analysis" (hypothesis generation), particularly for novice problem
solvers. Both accounts prefer some optimal level of abstraction for the retrieved source if
it is to be useful in achieving a target solution. Where that optimal level can be found
remains an open question.
Beyond utility of a retrieved source in terms of abstraction, it appears that qualita
tively different information may be made available in different instances of problem solving
by analogy. According to the previous account of heeding problem relevant information,
what is retrieved in analogical reasoning may be determined by the circumstances which
lead a problem solver to an impasse in the target problem. Thus if a subject is "stuck"
while trying to find an operator whose application would yield movement towards a goal
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state, she might be reminded of previous problem solving episodes which bear strong simi
larity by virtue of having similar goal states, constraints or types of operators. This is the
gist of Holyoak's (1985) contextual-relevance argument. Alternately, impasse may occur
in achieving an adequate representation of a target problem, well before consideration
of how to apply available operators. Clement's documentation of problem solvers feeling
"stuck" and concentrating on key relations in the problem statement may be indicative
of the latter situation. In either case, we might expect that qualitatively different forms
of analogy could occur: in the first case (impasse over operators) an actual solution plan
from a previous problem solving experience might be retrieved and used; in the latter case
(representational impasse) an entirely different problem model might be retrieved and used
(e.g., that of a bending saw or compressible foam - both reported by Clement's subjects
[1983]). Unfortunately, distinctions between problem solving cases, problem schemata,
problem models, and abstract principles remain elusive.
Several generalizations are possible regarding use of a retrieved analogy.
1. Howsources are used in problem solvingcan be described as an incremental process of
hypothesis generation and confirmation. Problem solution by analogy, as documented
by Clement, may not be instantaneous.
2. A subject's knowledge of the source should be seen eis providing an upper bound on
what may be transferred into the target. An acontextual consideration of the source
probably cannot predict what will be transferred in practice.
3. A subject's knowledge of the target goes further in predicting what will be transferred
by:
a. allowing context-relevant consideration of the source in generating hypotheses,
and
b. allowing validation or confirmation of these hypotheses.
4. What is available for transfer may vary depending upon the circumstances under
which access occurs (problem impasses) and the abstractness of a retrieved source.
Optimal abstractness balances ease of access against utility.
6. Contributions of psychology and related disciplines
Before examining computational approaches to analogical reasoning, and in particular
the use of analogy in learning, it seems appropriate to ask what the various disciplines
discussed in previous sections of this paper can contribute to work in AI. In particular,
four issues caji be extracted from these other literatures which are of significance for AI:
1. the importance and prevalence of analogical reasoning in human thinking generally,
2. likely cognitive structures underlying analogical reasoning,
3. implications of these structural arrangements for process models of analogical rea
soning,
4. and the role which analogical reasoning plays in learning.
With regard to the importance of analogical reasoning, opposing arguments have been
described for each of the academic disciplines discussed in previous sections: linguistics,
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education, philosophy and psychology. Opponents ofanalogy and metaphor see figurative
expression as, at hest, ornamentation of literal expression and, at worst, as a misleading
disguise for poor understanding of the topic under consideration. Proponents, on the other
hand, find analogy or metaphor an indispensible and ubiquitous constituent of human
cognition. In parallel with this controversy, comparison and interaction based-theories of
figurative expression allow metaphor differing access to center stage in cognition.
Out of this varied landscape, an emerging path can be found, although by no means
would all participants follow calmly. First, metaphor does indeed appear ubiquitous in
human cognition; second, metaphor can be seen to provide a powerful problem setting
in cultural, socio-political and scientific contexts; and third, metaphor may well provide
an epistemological bridge both for maintaining some form of linguistic economy and for
acquiring novel information, possibly through a mechanism of hypothesis generation and
verification very similar to that described for scientific theory formation. Central to each of
these observations is the notion that metaphor and analogy are not cognitive or expressive
oddities but are important in many aspects of cognition, perhaps underlying the very
manner in which we perceive and reason about our environment.
Whether taken as a general ability, synaesthesia, homeostatic transformation, stim
ulus generalization or "information processing," analogical reasoning has long fascinated
psychologists. It is from this academic discipline that one might expect significant contri
butions to research in AI. However, the psychological approaches to analogy andmetaphor
discussed in preceding sections raise more questions than they answer. Theoretical ori
entations towards the subject matter are varied and may yield consensus on relatively
little: analogical reasoning depends upon some sort of similarity, from the stimulus level
through to general intellectual abilities. Exemplary psychological studies are likewise var
ied, but provide some interesting contrasts: processing specificity can often be purchased
at the cost of representational generality; relatively acontextual, comparison-based views
of concept similarity may be insufficient for convincing accounts of metaphor and analogy;
and effective transfer ofproblem solving skills between domains depends in a complicated
fashion upon both subject and situational factors. While not conclusive, psychological
studies of metaphor and analogy provide interesting suggestions and constraints for com
putational efforts which arejust beginning. Contributions are evident both for knowledge
representations and processes supporting analogical reasoning.
A clear trend is evident towards interest in more fiexible, "schematic" or "structured"
forms of representation for knowledge accessed during analogical reasoning. As argued
convincingly by Ortony et al. (1978) nearly a decade ago, static featural or propositional
notations appear implausible as underlying supports for flexible language use, typically
leading researchers to postulate exceptional processing mechanisms to include figurative
capabilities within their models. However, the goal of an integrated account of literal
and figurative cognitive behaviors could still prove elusive for both psychologists and AI
researchers: there may be no reason to assume that the advocated schema or frame-based
knowledge representation techniques will make researchers more insightful. In practice,
concepts developed using less fiexible (and less complex) propositional representations
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could still prove useful even if such representational commitments are not pursued in AI
research.
For processes involved in analogical reasoning, there appears to be general agreement
over the importance of recognition and retrieval of potential source analogs, elaboration of
the ground or mapping which relates the domains in question, transfer and evaluation of
confirmed or suspected corresponding relations, and consolidation of information gained
during successful analogical reasoning in a form which will be subsequently available. While
these processes depend in some measure on the unsettled issue of a representation for the
memory structures involved, much of the recent work on ajialogical reasoning in problem
solving utilizing structured (or schematic) representations seems particularity promising.
In particular. Centner's (1982) descriptive taxonomy of varied metaphors and advocacy
of "systematicity" (Centner, 1983a) in structure mapping provide useful notions of what
constitutes a "good analogy" for varied purposes and what sorts of relational information
might be preferred when extending such an analogy. This notion of partial similarity at
some level of representational abstraction is supported by Holyoak's (1984a) discussion of
the importance of causal relevance and the necessity of forming abstract problem solving
schemata if analogies are to be effectively recognized and applied. Finally, Clement (1982,
1983) provides useful insights into the manner in which expert problem solvers utilize
analogical reasoning in arriving at solutions to nontrivial problems. Chains of supporting
analogies, some of which are actively generated by simplification of a problem at hand, are
suggestive of how analogical reasoning may fit into an ongoing problem solving context. As
may be evident in concluding remarks for the section on analogy in problem solving, there
are many fruitful avenues of exploration opened by these studies to which computational
approaches might make considerable contributions.
Although the role of analogical reasoning in learning has already been mentioned,
the enthusiasm in machine learning circles for "learning by analogy" (Mostow, 1983)
recommends a close look at how analogy might contribute to learning. In fact, much
of the psychological literature described above suggests that analogy simply provides grist
for a relatively straightforward inductive mill (e.g, Holyoak's eliminative induction), a
suggestion hardly worthy of revel in AI circles where work on inducing concepts from
examples has a long history (Dietterich and Michalski, 1983; Angluin and Smith, 1984).
However, it may be that learning in the context of analogical reasoning provides different
possibilities than traditional computational studies of induction. These studies generally
assume a well-behaved (e.g., noise free) environment attended by a benevolent teacher
where the learner receives both explicit (in the form of teacher suggestions) and implicit
(in the form of a carefully chosen conceptual vocabulary) guidance. Research problems
in which the learner is assumed able to spontaneously recognize and elaborate analogies
between previous and current experiences will likely force a wider consideration of how the
learner's reasoning is focused. These issues will be discussed more fully in the conclusion to
the second part of this survey. In summary, perhaps the notion of metaphor and analogy
as a problem setting which constrains hypothesis generation and suggests illuminating
experimentation will prove one of the more important contributions of the disciplines
surveyed above for computational approaches to analogical reasoning.
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